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Introduction 
Budgeting of various government sponsored programs, how to improve allocation and the 
reach of tax dollars throughout the population, is an important policy question. To get a glimpse 
into how to the government allocates tax dollars and, on a smaller scale, how the government 
ensures that its citizens are better off with every passing year, I examine the operations of the 
Division of Liens and Recovery in New York City.  
The Division of Liens and Recovery deals with recouping money for Medicaid and 
Public Assistance programs from clients who have gotten sponsored by these programs. Suppose 
a person X sues the city and wins a settlement. This person has injuries that have been treated in 
a hospital, and sometimes the hospital bills have been paid for by Medicaid. The city has then 
overcompensated person X. This is because person X has received a settlement from the injuring 
party, which was already meant to compensate for the injury related medical costs. The Division 
of Liens deducts the medical injury related costs out of the client’s settlement amount. It does so 
by placing liens on client’s settled cases from personal injury claims and law suits. Liens are 
rights of payment from clients in the amount of their medical costs and public assistance. By 
collecting from the settlement amount that is due to the client, the Division of Liens and 
Recovery is ensuring that they are getting reimbursed for paying for the client’s medical costs 
and that the client is not getting over compensated. For example, if the person who injured the 
client owes the client money for the injury then they should pay for said client’s Medical costs 
and Public Assistance that the client was receiving from the government back to the government. 
The city is also considered an injured party because the defendant who injured the client thus 
causes the city to pay out for the client’s medical care and Public Assistance. Hence, the 
settlement amount is not considered the client’s money to begin with. The money first must be 
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processed by the city so that they can recoup the payment for the client’s Medicaid and Public 
Assistance that they paid to the client while the client was injured. Then, the remaining sum goes 
to the said client. By collecting a lien, the city is not taking the client’s money. They are taking 
the defendants money that was the defendant paid out for the client’s medical injury related 
costs.  
1.1 Background 
To understand how and under what regulations the Division on Liens and Recovery 
operates, it is important to understand what Medicaid and Public Assistance programs are and 
their history. Medicaid was signed into law in 1965 by President Lyndon B Johnson and was 
authorized by title XIX of the Social Security Act.1 It provides health coverage for low income 
peoples in all the US states, the District of Columbia, and the US territories. Each state was given 
the right to administer the program differently, even though Medicaid is jointly administered by 
the states and federal government.2 Public Assistance, also known as Cash Assistance, was 
created earlier than Medicaid. The beginnings of the welfare system that provided public 
assistance can be traced back to the Social Security Act of 1935.3  
                                                          
1 Joseph D.  Juenger, “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid 
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” 35 N. Ky. L. Rev, (2008): 107.     
2 Ibid., 107. 
3 "Origins of the State and Federal Public Welfare Programs (1932 – 1935)." Social Welfare History Project. 
December 01, 2016. Accessed February 21, 2019. https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/public-welfare/origins-of-
the-state-federal-public-welfare-programs/. 
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For the purposes of this paper, an important change occurred in 1996, the welfare system 
got changed to TANF and this is what it is known as today.4 TANF stands for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families and is a federally administered program that allows states to 
administer its own programs to assist the needy.5  
New York, specifically, has many Public Assistance programs. For example, One Shot is 
a program that that helps pay for bills in months of bad financial management. Another program, 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP, provides nutritional assistance to low 
income families. All programs under Public Assistance are “payers of last resort” meaning that, 
they help the needy when there is no other way for them to receive assistance. Similarly, 
Medicaid is also a payer of last resort. Payers of last resort such as SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid 
are allowed by law to recoup funds paid out to individuals on any of these programs who file for 
a personal injury claim or suit.6  
The Division of Liens and Recovery can collect on personal injury cases according to two 
laws stated above, NYS SSL 104 and NYS SSL 104b. In its original form NYS SSL 104 was 
passed in 1940.7 This law concerns recovering compensation from a person discovered to have 
property or to have come into significant wealth who has previously received Public Assistance. 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 1. 
5 Ibid., 1. 
6 Joseph D.  Juenger, “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid 
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” 35 N. Ky. L. Rev, (2008): 107.     
7 Michael A. Bottar, “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury 
Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (2003): 
184. 
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Since the client has been awarded a significant amount of money, this law allows for the 
department to collect up to 10 years back in Public Assistance that was awarded to the client. 
Under this law the department has the right to sue the client that is not willing to pay the 
department for up to 10 years of Public Assistance that was provided to them.8 Similarly, NYS 
SSL 104b  allows the Division of Liens and Recovery to file liens against personal injury if the 
recipient of the settlement is on Public Assistance (from the date of their accident to the 
settlement date) and/or has medical care paid for by Medicaid that is related to the accident after 
the date of the accident to the settlement date.9 The statute involving Medicaid was added into 
law in 1964.10   
Aside from the statutes, NYS SSL 104 and 104b, the applications for Medicaid and 
Public Assistance programs have an “assignment clause” that states that when a client pursues 
any personal injury claims they assign the resources they get to Medicaid.11 This means that the 
Division of Liens and Recovery has the right to place a lien on the client’s settlement amount up 
to what was paid out in Medicaid or Public Assistance. Essentially, when applying for Medicaid 
and Public Assistance the client agrees to the assignment clause during the application process 
and acknowledges that he or she has given the department permission to file a lien on any 
medical injury law suit or claim that they bring up. 
                                                          
8 "2014 New York Laws :: SOS - Social Services :: Article 3 - LOCAL PUBLIC WELFARE ORGANIZATION; 
POWERS AND DUTIES :: Title 6 - (101 - 111) POWERS TO ENFORCE SUPPORT :: 104 - Recovery from a 
Person Discovered to Have Property." Justia Law. Accessed February 21, 2019. https://law.justia.com/codes/new-
york/2014/sos/article-3/title-6/104/. 
9 "2014 New York Laws :: SOS - Social Services :: Article 3 - LOCAL PUBLIC WELFARE ORGANIZATION; 
POWERS AND DUTIES :: Title 6 - (101 - 111) POWERS TO ENFORCE SUPPORT :: 104-B - Liens for Public 
Assistance and Care on Claims and Suits for Personal Injuries." Justia Law. Accessed February 21, 2019. 
https://law.justia.com/codes/new-york/2014/sos/article-3/title-6/104-b/. 
10 Michael A. Bottar, “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury 
Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (2003): 
185. 
11 Ibid., 108. 
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Overall, in New York City, the recovery of money paid out to clients after a personal 
injury case settles is an interesting topic to investigate because it provides insight into how the 
government functions on a basic city level. It also allows for extensive data analysis in hopes of 
tracking patterns of possible improvements that can be made to the functions of the Division of 
Liens and Recovery which will increase monetary recoupments and hence the welfare of the city. 
Essentially, the objective of writing this paper is to use the knowledge gained and extrapolate it 
to other lien and recovery departments increasing the social benefit among the dwellers of other 
states. 
1.2 The Question 
 This research paper is concerned with finding which factors lead to recoupment and 
which factors explain recoupment amounts with the overarching objective to use the analysis in 
order to understand which variables increase reimbursement funds that will be reinjected into 
Medicaid and Public Assistance programs. This study meassures the client and firm 
characteristics such as the settlement amount of their case, their age, how long the case has been 
in the MAESTRO system for, the client’s borough of residence, and the defending law firm’s 
location in order to see if a specific client and or firm characteristics impact the amount of 
recoupment. MAESTRO is the name of the analytical tool that all the data is gathered in. 
Additionally, the firm’s names will be used to track whether specific firms have effects on 
recoupment amounts. Ultimately, modeling this information and interpreting the results can help 
create public policy that will help the city recoup and recover more money from settled personal 
injury cases and pave a path for better money management of the Medicaid program.  
2 Literature Review 
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 While looking for articles to review related to the question at hand, it has become clear 
that this type of research has not yet been done. The articles that I did find fell into three 
categories. These articles either compared recoupment language among states, explained the 
need for a recoupment and compared Medicaid and Medicare recoupment processes. 
Additionally, studies on litigation and bargaining and how to conduct negotiations are plentiful 
and although the tactics will not be discussed in this paper having a strategy when negotiating is 
worth mentioning because it does speak on the Division of Liens and Recovery collection 
abilities. In, “Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement” by (Craver 2009), it is explained that 
simply practicing and interacting with clients does not make one a great negotiator and only 
hours of negotiation practice can make a good negotiator.12 Meaning that, the art of negotiation 
should be taught to analysts so that they can negotiate with attorneys higher recoupment amounts 
and increase the reimbursements to the Division. Ultimately, although there are no articles that 
describe similar data analytics to what I want to perform, these articles lead in the general 
direction of answering the question of how to improve the collection process of Medicaid; this 
question is one of the driving sources for my research.  
2.1 Comparing Recoupment Among States 
 “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid 
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” (Juenger 2008), describes a personal injury case in 
Arkansas and illustrates the similarity of wording on recovering medical costs between 
Oklahoma and New York, showing that New York is not different in its recovery tactics. In this 
personal injury lawsuit, a 19-year-old college student, Heidi Ahlborn, was injured in an 
automobile accident and left permanently brain damaged. The state of Arkansas paid almost 
                                                          
12 Charles B. Craver, “Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement,” PDF, (1986): 9. 
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$216,000 to medical providers on her behalf. When she later sued the injurer, the state tried to 
recoup that $216,000. However, Ahlborn only settled for $550,000 and argued that the amount 
was only 1/6 of what she should have received in the settlement, so the government should only 
charge her 1/6 of the $216,000 medical bill. She won the case and the government recovered 
approximately $36,000.13 This Arkansas case has demonstrated the importance of assignment of 
rights to recoup Medicaid funds and allowed for other states like Oklahoma to go a step further 
by placing a lien on the injurer, “Per session law, Oklahoma expressly seeks to continue to 
employ liens to recover Medicaid expenditures from third-party tortfeasors.”14 Placing a lien 
insures and promotes that the Medicaid expenditures will be paid back and re-injected into the 
plan  to help cover the costs of other Medicaid users. Similarly, the wording of the law in 
Oklahoma is similar to the wording of New York law; in New York, the law is written  “[anyone 
who]…has a ‘lien’ on any third-party recoveries where medical expenses have been paid by 
Medicaid.”15 This demonstrates that New York is not the only state that has a recoupment 
process and that New York’s wording when it comes to state’s right to collect a lien is not unique 
and unheard of. Thus, the similar wording that allows for recoupment of funds to be reinjected 
into the Medicaid budget illustrates each state’s approach to be able to provide health services 
for those who need them. 
 Similarly to Oklahoma, Virginia’s provisions also mirror those of New York.16 In, 
“Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury 
                                                          
13 Joseph D.  Juenger, “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid 
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” 35 N. Ky. L. Rev, (2008): 107.     
14 Ibid., 117. 
15 Ibid., 116. 
16 Michael A. Bottar, “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury 
Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (2003): 
203. 
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Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” Michael A. 
Bottar explains that in Virginia’s law, “Section 8.01-66.9 provides that when the Commonwealth 
pays for or provides medical services because of a tortious injury, a lien is created in favor of the 
Commonwealth for the amount of those services. The lien is placed against a future personal 
injury recovery brought by a Medicaid recipient or their representative.”17 In other words, the 
state of Virginia, like New York, is allowed to place a lien to recoup medical costs paid out on 
behalf of a Medicaid client. Nonetheless, the two states are not entirely similar in their provisions 
because, “the Medicaid reimbursement scheme under Virginia Code section 8.01-66.9 is 
considerably more flexible than the statutory recovery provisions of New York's Social Services 
Law.”18 Although the two states mirror each other in language for recovery purposes and impose 
liens some states are more discretionary when it comes to how much they are willing to negotiate 
and reduce that lien for the injured client. Thus, there is a tradition in several states of trying to 
recover funds that can be used to further the interests of society.  
2.2 Why Recoupments Are Necessary 
  “An Examination of the Personal Injury Plaintiff's Struggle for Adequate Compensation 
under Government Rights of Reimbursement,” by (Smith 2013), answers why there is a need for 
recovery and outlines a plan of how to increase the benefit of tax dollars. Understanding why 
there is a need for recovery allows for a passageway to improve collection methods which in turn 
increases reinjection back into Medicaid. Kaitlin M. Smith, says that, “rights of reimbursement 
held by the government under these programs provide two main functions in society; they allow 
the government to provide immediate care to an injured plaintiff who cannot afford medical care 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 203. 
18 Ibid., 205. 
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up front, as well as safeguarding taxpayers from an increased financial burden.”19 The collection 
of recoupments and Medicaid itself are necessary because by reinjecting funds back into 
Medicaid these recoupments, in part, ensure that everyone in the society is covered if a Medical 
injury happens to them. Smith goes further to suggest a bifurcated process of collection during 
trials in which evidence is presented in the initial phase of the trial and then the jury decides if 
the defendant is liable. If the defendant is liable, the jury then decides how much they should 
payback the government based on the calculated damages amount.20 This process will allow for a 
quicker repayment to the government because the lien amount will be calculated prior to the trial 
and the defendant will know how much he has to pay back to the government. Therefore, the 
defendant will be making the direct payment to the government without the money reaching the 
client first. Moreover, the process will not make the injured plaintiff feel as if the repayment of 
their medical care is being taken out of their settlement amount. Although this is a good 
suggestion, there is no data or testing done on whether such a method would work to better the 
recoupment process. Smith uses hypothetical scenarios to suggest that this method would work. 
This a good start in thinking of how to make the system function better, and to open up the study 
of increasing Medicaid recoupments.  
2.3 Comparing Medicaid and Medicare Recoupments 
“Giving an Inch, Then Taking a Mile: How the Government's Unrestricted Recovery of 
Conditional Medicare Payments Destroys Plaintiffs' Chances at Compensation through the Tort 
System,” by (Miklos 2010), compares Medicaid and Medicare collection processes in order to 
demonstrate how rigid collection systems can damage clients’ chances of being compensated 
                                                          
19 Kaitlin M. Smith, “An Examination of the Personal Injury Plaintiff's Struggle for Adequate Compensation under 
Government Rights of Reimbursement,” 22 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y (2013): 270. 
20 Ibid., 296. 
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under Medicare. This has strong implications for Medicaid because Medicaid is also a 
government funded program. Increasing reimbursements is debated by Miklos to decrease 
overall just compensation. She argues that, “allowing the government full recovery from 
settlements makes Medicare beneficiaries undesirable clients for medical malpractice attorneys 
because it reduces their net recovery. Plaintiffs' attorneys will only agree to representation when 
they believe it is profitable to do so.”21 Essentially, if the government can recover the entire 
amount of the settlement the plaintiff will have no incentive to sue at all. This is comparable in 
the Medicaid situation because although we are researching how to increase Medicaid collections 
it should be taken into account that extremely high recoupments can lead to clients not suing, 
plaintiff attorneys not taking cases and Medicaid not being able to recover anything at all. 
Comparing the full recovery of Medicare as opposed to limited recovery of Medicaid provides 
useful insight into policy implementation of increased Medicaid recoupments while maintaining 
balance and not isolating clients from having their cases heard.  
3 Data 
The MAESTRO system is the primary data source for the analysis. The data is gathered on 
all cases that were settled from the year 2014 to 2018. We are only provided with cases that were 
opened and closed in the MAESTRO system between zero to four years. The primary dependent 
variable is Payment, and it is a continuous variable that represents the amount that the 
department was paid, or in other words, the recoupment amount. This recoupment amount 
includes recoupments from Medicaid and Public Assistance. Throughout the paper, the Payment 
variable will be referred to as the “recoupment amount” and should not be confused with the 
                                                          
21 Nicole Miklos, “Giving an Inch, Then Taking a Mile: How the Government's Unrestricted Recovery of 
Conditional Medicare Payments Destroys Plaintiffs' Chances at Compensation through the Tort System,” 84 St. 
John's L. Rev. 305 (2010): 320. 
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recoup variable. The recoup variable is a binary variable created to represent 1 if there is a 
recoupment and 0 if there is not a recoupment.  
The independent variables consist of client characteristics and the client’s representing law 
firm characteristics: the client’s settlement amount divided by 10,000 for ease of interpretation, 
client’s age, the borough the client lives in, how long the case was open in the MAESTRO 
system, the law firms’ location by borough, and the law firm names. The independent client 
characteristic variables are labeled as Settleby100, AgeAll, BoroughCode, O2CAll, 
FrimBorough and FirmNameCode, respectively. Settleby100, AgeAll, and O2CAll are measured 
continuously while the remaining variables are measured nominally or categorically.  
BoroughCode is a categorical variable and is split into groups. Each borough is assigned a 
number one through five and these numbers are collapsed into Borough dummy variables. The 
other independent variables are firm characteristics which consist of the firm’s name that is 
linked to each individual case and the borough in which that firm operates. The variables are 
labeled as FirmNameCode and FirmBoro respectively. There are 1539 unique law firms, so each 
firm is assigned a number from 1 to 1539. There are fewer firms than cases, because some firms 
handled more than one case. To measure the location of the attorney’s law firm, each the 
borough from which the law firm originates is also assigned a number in the same manner as the 
location of the client’s addresses. The only difference between the client’s and the law firm’s 
addresses is that if a law firm is located outside the five boroughs then that law firm gets 
assigned a number six. Since New York City only recoups payments for clients from the five 
boroughs it makes sense that each client’s address is assigned a number one through five. 
However, New York City does not limit the location to which the client’s law firm can be from 
hence, there is an added category labeled with the number six, for firms that are outside the five 
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boroughs. Ultimately, the client characteristics and the law firm characteristics are used to 
predict whether there will be a recoupment or not and if there is a recoupment then how much 
will be recouped.  
The summary statistics are presented in the first two tables. From the first table we can see 
that there is a total of 9,521 observations and approximately 43.3% of those cases had a 
recoupment. The average recoupment amount is $8,094. The minimum recoupment amount was 
$419.4 while the maximum was $600,000. The average age for a client was approximately 48 
years old. The average time a case was open in the MAESTRO system was one year. The 
minimum settlement amount was $850 and the maximum was $22 million. The average 
settlement amount was around $129,000. From table 2 we can see that there was a total of 1,187 
clients who live in Manhattan and a total of 4,497 firms operating in Manhattan. We can also 
observe that there were 693 cases with clients who lived in Manhattan and had representing law 
firms in Manhattan as well. We can also see that 81 cases had clients from Manhattan and their 
representing law firms from Brooklyn. The average recoupment amount seems to be small, less 
than 10% of the settlement amount. The rest of the summary data can be interpreted in a similar 
fashion.  
4 Methodology 
 To complete the analysis, this paper uses ordinary least squares, fixed effects modeling, 
Probit, and Heckman. The regression and Probit treats recoupment amounts and the recoupment 
decisions separately, while Heckman allows them to be interdependent. The first model is a 
simple linear regression, regressing payment on client characteristics and client’s law firm 
characteristics such as settlement amount, client’s age, length of time the client’s case has been 
in the MAESTRO system, the borough in which the client lives in, and the firm’s borough. Three 
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types of basic regressions are performed. The first regression includes client characteristics and 
excludes the client boroughs and law firm locations. The second regression includes all the client 
characteristics and excludes law firm locations. The third regression includes all the client and 
law firm characteristics.  This is done in order to see if the borough codes and the law firm 
locations add anything interesting to the models.  
The second model in this paper is a fixed effects model which is used to control for law 
firm characteristics in order to see if controlling for law firm characteristics would change the 
effect of the client characteristics on recoupment amount. There are 1539 unique law firms so 
dummy variables are created for each unique firm name. Due to the multitude of dummy 
variables pertaining to each unique firm, the “areg” command is used. A lot of these dummies 
just drop out if the firm has only handled one case, hence, allowing firms with multiple cases to 
be different with the single case firms as the base group. The third model, an addition to the 
second model, analyzes the firm codes by their frequency of cases in order to understand whether 
specific law firms contribute to lower recoupment amounts. Dummy variables are created for law 
firms that have a frequency of greater than fifty firms matching the same firm code. The number 
fifty is used because it is thought that law firms with over fifty cases are perhaps more used to 
dealing with litigating recoupments and paying out less to Medicaid, so it might be that 
recoupment amounts are lower in these cases.  With the created dummies, these additional 
variables are added into the regression with client characteristics to try to identify firms that 
consistently either increase or decrease the recoupment amount. Three regressions are performed 
and each regression includes the same variables as the three regressions in the OLS models, 
described above, with the addition of the dummy variables. 
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The fourth model that is estimated is a Probit model which estimates the probability of 
recoupment as a function of case characteristics. The same variables are used in this model as in 
the previously described OLS model. Also, three Probit models are run in the same manner as 
three OLS models without the location variables and then adding the location variables. These 
regressions are run in order to see if adding client location and firm location ads any interesting 
information to the model. However, in the Probit model, marginal effects are also estimated in 
order to make interpretations.  
These four simple models are good starting points. However, results from linear 
regressions tend to be biased because we are not observing the equation for the entire population; 
not all cases have received a recoupment/payment. Using a regular regression in this case might 
cause sample selection bias. To avoid sample selection bias, I use the Heckman model. The first 
stage of the Heckman is estimated using a Probit and measures whether there is a recoupment or 
not. Then the inverse mills ratio, or lambda, is calculated and used in the second stage as an 
additional independent variable. The second stage is then estimated by linear regression. With 
the Heckman model we measure if the Division of Liens and recovery receives a recoupment, 
then how much will the recoupment be. The model allows correlation between the amount of 
recoupment and whether or not any recoupment is observed. The marginal effects are then 
calculated in order to be able to interpret the coefficients. The Heckman model is calculated as is 
and with the “twostep” command in order to demonstrate the likeness of the results, that the 
model can be calculated in two different ways, and to fit regression models with selection.22 It is 
typical to have some variables that are in the Probit that are not in the regression equation when 
                                                          
22 “Heckman- Heckman Selection Model,” PDF file. Accessed April 19, 2019. 
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rheckman.pdf.  
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estimating a Heckman model. I use all the variables in both models and relying on the functional 
form to identify the model. Overall, OLS, fixed effects, Probit, and Heckman, are utilized in 
order to complete this analysis.  
5 Results 
 Table 3 shows the three OLS regressions. The first one does not include any borough/ 
location variables for either the client or the law firm. All things held constant, recoupment 
amount is on average $3,041. The only significant variable is the settlement amount. Meaning 
that, a one dollar increase in settlement amount leads to an approximately $0.02 increase in 
recoupment amount. In the second regression, where the client boroughs are added, the 
settlement amount is still significant with the same coefficient, making the analysis for that 
variable the same as the model without the client boroughs. Additionally, Bronx and Staten 
Island are boroughs which have significant coefficients in this model. Compared to clients who 
live in Manhattan, clients who live in the Bronx have on average $2,036 more in recoupment 
amount. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients who live in Staten Island have on 
average $3,197 less in recoupment amount. The constant decreases in the second model to 
$2,260 being the average recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared increases 
from 0.32 to 0.323 from model one to model two which can be interpreted as the borough 
coefficients not adding a lot to the explanatory power to the model. In the third regression model 
we add the law firm’s location characteristics. The third OLS model also has the same significant 
coefficients on settlement amount and thus the same interpretation as the previous two models. 
Bronx and Staten Island are still significant. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients 
who live in the Bronx have on average $1,922 more in recoupment amount. Compared to clients 
who live in Manhattan, clients who live in Staten Island have on average $3,896 less in 
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recoupment amount. The constant decreases in the third model, to $2,027, being the average 
recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared in this model increases by only 0.001 
and none of the law firm locations are significant which signals that adding them into the model 
does not create a big difference in the accuracy of the model.  
Table 4 shows the results of the fixed effects model; it is a regression using the “areg” 
command. All things held constant, and accounting for law firm fixed effects, recoupment 
amount is on average $2,089 according to this model. The significant variables are settlement 
amount and how long the case was open in the MAESTRO system for. The difference between 
the fixed effect model and the regular regression is that now, how long the case was open in the 
system for, O2CAll, has a significant effect and can be meaningfully interpreted. A one dollar 
increase in settlement amount leads to an approximate $0.02 increase in recoupment amount, 
controlling for law firm fixed effects. Or to be more specific a $10,000 increase in the settlement 
amount leads to an approximate $200 increase in recoupment amount. This is essentially the 
same result as using the regular regression without having law firm fixed effects. Moreover, a 
one- year increase in the length the case stays open in the system leads to a $728 increase in 
recoupment amount, controlling for law firm fixed effects. Essentially, the coefficients did not 
change significantly so controlling for law firm fixed effects did not create a better model.   
The results in Table 5 show that all the dummy variables created on law firm names 
based on their assigned codes were insignificant. In other words, creating these dummy variables 
and adding them to the OLS model did not have any significant effects on increasing or 
decreasing recoupment amount. The coefficients did change slightly from the regular OLS model 
but not enough to have a different effect than the OLS model showed. This first regression with 
law firm name dummy variables shows that all things held constant, recoupment amount is on 
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average $3,455.124. The only significant variable is the settlement amount which means that a 
one dollar increase in settlement amount leads to an approximately $0.02 increase in recoupment 
amount. Or, for every $10,000 increase in the settlement amount the recoupment amount 
increases by approximately $200. In the second regression, where the client boroughs are added 
in, the settlement amount is still significant with almost the same coefficient, making the analysis 
for that variable the same as the model without the client boroughs. Comparatively to the regular 
regression model, Bronx and Staten Island, client boroughs, are boroughs which have significant 
coefficients. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients who live in the Bronx have on 
average $2,117 more in recoupment amount. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients 
who live in Staten Island have on average $3,376 less in recoupment amount. The constant 
decreases in the second model with law firm dummy variables to $2,588 being the average 
recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared increases from 0.321 to 0.324 from 
model one to model two which can be interpreted as the borough coefficients not adding a lot to 
the explanatory power to the model. In the third model with law firm dummy variables the law 
firm’s location characteristics are added. This model has significant coefficients on settlement 
amount as the regular OLS model and thus the same interpretation as the previous two models 
applies. Bronx and Staten Island client boroughs are still significant. Compared to clients who 
live in Manhattan, clients who live in the Bronx have on average $2,027 more in recoupment 
amount. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients who live in Staten Island have on 
average $3,748 less in recoupment amount. The constant decreases in the third model, to $2,363, 
being the average recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared in this model 
increases by only 0.001 and none of the law firm locations are significant which signals that 
adding them into the model does not create a big difference in the accuracy of the model. Table 6 
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is created to show the exact effect each law firm dummy variable has on recoupment amount, 
however, since none of the dummy variables is significant, Table 3 is presented first and 
simplifies the dummy variables into one effect.  
 In Table 7 I present results from the estimation of the Probit model. This model predicts 
whether there will be a recoupment or not. The first Probit equation does not include any 
borough/ location variables for either the client or the law firm. The second equation includes 
borough variables of the client but not location variables for the law firm. The third equation 
includes everything, borough variables from the client and from the law firm. The coefficients 
are not easily interpretable, so the marginal effects, labeled in columns 4, 5 and 6 are used to 
make interpretations. In the first model, the settlement amount, age of the client, and how long 
the case was in the system for are significant variables that carry a meaningful interpretation. For 
every $10,000 increase in the Settlement Amount the likelihood of recoupment increases by 0.7 
percent. A one-year increase in age increases the probability of recoupment by 0.3 percent. A 
one-year increase in the length the case is open in the MAESTRO system increase the 
probability of recoupment by 8.3 percent. In the second version of the Probit model, when the 
client boroughs are added, it is observed that Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island have 
significant effects on the probability of recoupment. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, 
clients that are from Brooklyn have a 7.9 percent lower likelihood of recoupment. Compared to 
clients who live in Manhattan, clients that are from Queens have a 13.7 percent lower probability 
of recoupment. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients that are from Staten Island 
have a probability of 13.1 percent lower recoupment. In the third Probit model, where law firm 
boroughs are added, we can see that law firms that are located in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens, 
Staten Island and outside of New York City have a significant effect on whether there is a 
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recoupment or not. Compared to law firms that are located in Manhattan, law firms that located 
in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Staten Island decrease the probability of recoupment by 5.3, 
7.7, 10.8, and 7.4 percent respectively. Compared to law firms that are located in Manhattan, law 
firms that are located outside of New York City increase the probability of recoupment by 3.6 
percent respectively. The differences across the boroughs might be because law firms outside the 
five boroughs are more willing to pay recoupments in order to avoid law suits. These firms might 
be smaller than New York City law firms and less willing to risk being shut down due to a large 
lawsuit.  
 Table 8 demonstrates the results of the Heckman model. Marginal effects are once again 
needed to make an interpretation. It is shown that, the settlement amount of the case, the client’s 
age, how long the case was open in the system for, client boroughs such as Brooklyn and 
Queens, and law firm locations such as Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Staten Island are 
significant. What this means is that, given that there is a recoupment, for every $10,000 increase 
in the settlement amount the recoupment increases by $151. Additionally, per $10,000 increase 
in settlement amount, chances of recoupment go up by 0.01 or 1%.  The average marginal effect 
on age can be interpreted as, given that there is a recoupment, a one-year increase in age 
decreases the recoupment amount by $133. With a year increase in age, the likelihood of 
recoupment goes up by 0.2%. Furthermore, conditional on there being a recoupment with every 
year that the case is in the MAESTRO system, there is a decrease in recoupment amount by 
$3248. Given that there is a recoupment, clients that live in Brooklyn and Queens, as compared 
to clients that live in Manhattan, increase the recoupment amount by $2,299 and $4,463 
respectively. Given that there is a recoupment, law firms that are located in Brooklyn, Bronx, 
Queens and Staten Island increase the recoupment amount by $2,759, $4,877, $5,236, and 
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$6,421 respectively. Firms that are located outside New York City increase the probability of 
recoupment by 3%.   
 Table 9 illustrates the results of the Heckman model performed in two parts. It is 
illustrated that the settlement amount of the case, the client’s age, how long the case was open in 
the system for, client boroughs such as Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island and all law firm 
locations are significant. In other words, given that there is a recoupment, a $10,000 increase in 
the settlement amount increases the recoupment amount by $140. Also, per $10,000 increase in 
settlement amount, chances of recoupment go up by 0.6%. The average marginal effect on age 
can be interpreted as, a one-year increase in age increases the recoupment amount by 0.3%. 
Additionally, conditional on there being a recoupment, with every year that the case is in the 
MAESTRO system, there is a decrease in recoupment amount by $1,941. Given that there is a 
recoupment, clients that live in the Bronx, and Queens, as compared to clients that live in 
Manhattan, increase the recoupment amount by $1,665 and $3,002 respectively. Given that there 
is a recoupment, law firms that are located in the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island increase the 
recoupment amount by $4,042, $2,681, and $5,900 respectively. All the law firms within NYC 
compared to law firms that are in Manhattan decrease the chances of recoupment. Law firms 
located outside NYC increase the chances of recoupment by 3.5%. Comparing the results both 
Heckman models gives a similar conclusion that age and how long the case was in the system for 
decreases recoupment amounts while law firms that are located in the Bronx and Staten Island 
increases recoupment amount.  
The estimates of the Heckman relative to the estimates of the simple regressions and 
Probit are different, this can be observed in the tables. For example, in the OLS model a ten 
thousand dollar increase in the settlement amount leads to an approximate $169 increase in 
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recoupment amount. Similarly, in the Probit model for every $10,000 increase in the Settlement 
Amount the likelihood of recoupment increases. Comparative to the OLS and Probit model, in 
the Heckman model, when there is a ten thousand dollar increase in the settlement amount the 
recoupment amount increases by $151. In that same OLS model we saw that clients who live in 
the Bronx compared to clients who live in Manhattan increase recoupment amount. While clients 
who live in State Island decrease recoupment amount. This similar pattern was observed in the 
fixed effects model and the model where dummy variables are created to track the specific 
effects of law firms on recoupment amounts. Also, in the Heckman model, the client’s law firm 
location in most of the boroughs tends to increase the recoupment amount where as in the OLS 
and Probit models being located in one of the four boroughs compared to Manhattan tends to 
either decrease or increase recoupment amount and the probability of recoupment. After 
analyzing multiple models, the Heckman model is a superior model when compared to the OLS 
and Probit models. These different results go to show that sample selection is important and 
hence the Heckman model should be used because it accounts for such sample selection.  
6 Discussion 
 After performing multiple analysis, it becomes evident that based on the data it cannot be 
predicted which law firm should be targeted in order to increase recoupment amounts; however, 
client characteristics and law firm locations are good indicators to look for when working on a 
case. Throughout the models, Settlement Amount was consistently an important factor in 
determining there being a recoupment and an increased amount in recoupment. This makes 
logical sense because the higher the settlement amount is, the more serious a person’s injury 
could have been where they were required to use Medicaid which would qualify the settlement 
amount to be eligible for recoupment. The age of the client and how long that client’s case was 
  22 
in the MAESTRO system also came up as significant variables. This can be explained with the 
fact that the younger people, especially children born with disabilities due to malpractice have 
higher settlements and require more Medicaid coverage. If Medicaid provides those people with 
more coverage than they are more likely to recoup those larger sums when the injured client 
receives a settlement. An explanation to why the length of the case in the system is significant is 
because the longer the case stays in the system, the more likely it is that some medical charges 
might be disputed as not being related to the accident thus, decreasing the eligible recoupment 
amount. Overall, as a policy suggestion, it would make sense to have the more experienced 
analysts, in the Division of Liens and Recovery, to be first given cases that have high settlement 
amounts with people who are younger and live in Queens with their representing attorneys 
working in Staten Island. The chief conclusion being that the relationship between settlement 
amount and recoupment amount seems stable and the two cents on the dollar rule holds up. At 
this current time the experienced analysts get assigned the high value or high settlement amount 
cases, but the age and location of the clients and their law firms are not accounted for. If the 
cases with characteristics described above are prioritized and assigned to the senior analysts, the 
department should see an increase in recoupments and recoupment amounts.   
 Although a lot of analysis was performed in this study there are still a few limitations. 
One limitation is that the data that was available was only for the 2014-2018 years. A bigger data 
set could have shown more interesting results and potentially tracked patterns with law firms that 
were causing the department to lose money. Another limitation is that data on law firms was 
extremely limited to the name of the law firm and their location by borough. If there was more 
data available on the size of the law firm, the length of time this law firm was in business for, 
and etc more interesting variables could be added an observed within the model. Additionally, 
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since law firms and clients aren’t the only “players” in the recoupment process, if data on the 
analysts was available then this study could analyze which analysts were causing increases or 
decreases in the recoupment amount given that there was a recoupment. In summary, due to 
regulations and safety of clients, law firms and analysts the research was limited yet still 
provided useful insight.  
7  Conclusion 
 This study provided useful insight and potential suggestions to increasing the 
reimbursement of government paid out funds to cover Medicaid’s recipient’s medical injury 
related costs. It is concluded that senior analysts should be assigned cases with high settlement 
amounts and clients who are younger and live in Queens with their representing attorneys 
working in Staten Island. The next step would be for the Division of Liens and Recovery to 
create a tool that would do such prioritization and automatically assign cases to analysts based on 
their rank and based on the client’s and law firm’s characteristics. An interesting project going 
forward would be for the department to start collecting more data on law firms like how many 
employees each law firm has, and how long these law firms have been around for and etc. Also, 
to collect more information on the analysts and have it input in the MAESTRO system in order 
to increase the analyzing potential, increase recoupments, increase recoupment amounts and 
increase overall benefit to society. This paper worked with data that although was limited, helped 
pave a great starting point to analyzing government agencies and maximizing the efficiency of 
such agencies while creating a better society for the future generations to come.  
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List of Tables 
Summary Statistics Table 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean Sd Min Max 
      
Payment 4,120 8,094 22,916 419.4 600,000 
Age 9,521 48.10 17.94 2.151 104.1 
Open to Close 9,521 0.980 0.965 0 3.989 
Settlement Amount 9,521 128,694 532,011 850 2.200e+07 
Recoupment 9,521 0.433 0.495 0 1 
      
 
Summary Statistics Table 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 Manhattan Brooklyn Bronx Queens Staten Island  
 Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq  
Firm Borough (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) Total 
       
Manhattan 693*** 1,380*** 1,413*** 878*** 133*** 4,497 
 (58.38) (45.63) (54.22) (38.22) (32.68)  
Brooklyn 81*** 905*** 159*** 191*** 47*** 1,383 
 (6.824) (29.93) (6.101) (8.315) (11.55)  
Bronx 76*** 67*** 368*** 27*** 6*** 544 
 (6.403) (2.216) (14.12) (1.175) (1.474)  
Queens 117*** 236*** 205*** 718*** 24*** 1,300 
 (9.857) (7.804) (7.866) (31.26) (5.897)  
Staten Island 16*** 39*** 16*** 11*** 158*** 240 
 (1.348) (1.290) (0.614) (0.479) (38.82)  
Outside NYC 204*** 397*** 445*** 472*** 39*** 1,557 
 (17.19) (13.13) (17.08) (20.55) (9.582)  
       
Total 1187 3024 2606 2297 407 9,521 
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Table 3: OLS regressions of Payment on Settlement amount. Payment is measured in dollar 
amounts. Model (2) includes a client borough identifier and Model (3) includes a client borough 
identifier as well as a law firm location identifier. 
OLS Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Payment Payment Payment     
Settlement Amount  168.431*** 168.888*** 168.599***  
(3.867) (3.865) (3.879) 
Age 9.429 12.809 14.889  
(17.222) (17.274) (17.319) 
Open to Close 339.972 360.748 367.338  
(307.673) (307.307) (307.588) 
Brooklyn 
 
-80.379 200.654   
(933.857) (950.518) 
Bronx 
 
2,036.489** 1,922.007**   
(929.895) (933.746) 
Queens 
 
419.415 600.543   
(1,005.429) (1,021.120) 
Staten Island 
 
-3,197.489* -3,896.172**   
(1,694.064) (1,830.008) 
Firm- Brooklyn 
  
-1,130.995    
(970.541) 
Firm- Bronx 
  
1,949.586    
(1,357.585) 
Firm- Queens 
  
-986.757    
(1,066.871) 
Firm- Staten Island 
  
3,137.153    
(2,366.868) 
Firm- Not in NYC 
  
692.946    
(788.096) 
Constant 3,040.711*** 2,260.390* 2,026.829  
(1,011.681) (1,268.348) (1,292.336)     
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 
R-squared 0.320 0.323 0.324 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Fixed Effects Regression 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Payment 
  
Settlement Amount 162.840*** 
 (5.106) 
Age 25.657 
 (20.873) 
Open to Close 727.697** 
 (369.777) 
Brooklyn 717.198 
 (1,147.926) 
Bronx 2,532.051** 
 (1,146.936) 
Queens 1,203.560 
 (1,254.578) 
Staten Island -5,622.689** 
 (2,291.097) 
Firm - Brooklyn -2,662.979 
 (5,541.379) 
Firm - Bronx 545.937 
 (6,731.569) 
Firm - Queens -2,648.795 
 (5,113.879) 
Firm – Staten Island 4,329.184 
 (10,680.608) 
Firm – Not NYC -1,115.331 
 (3,239.966) 
Constant 1,524.585 
 (2,223.975) 
  
Observations 4,120 
R-squared 0.501 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: Results when accounting for law firm fixed effects.  
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Regressions with Condensed Firm Code Dummy Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Payment Payment Payment 
    
Settlement Amount 167.610*** 168.161*** 167.891*** 
 (3.840) (3.899) (3.916) 
Age 8.560 12.013 13.496 
 (17.421) (17.471) (17.501) 
Open to Close 308.890 318.366 343.087 
 (311.345) (310.946) (311.329) 
Brooklyn  16.661 265.752 
  (944.331) (959.153) 
Bronx  2,116.643** 2,027.010** 
  (936.753) (941.286) 
Queens  519.896 719.692 
  (1,016.419) (1,033.117) 
Staten Island  -3,375.753* -3,748.275** 
  (1,793.173) (1,861.055) 
Firm - Brooklyn   -1,342.817 
   (1,194.298) 
Firm - Bronx   1,652.894 
   (1,388.235) 
Firm - Queens   -1,213.602 
   (1,219.346) 
Firm – Staten Island   3,368.159 
   (2,707.118) 
Firm – Not NYC   566.315 
   (841.314) 
Firm Code Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant 3,455.124*** 2,588.258** 2,363.366* 
 (1,043.218) (1,294.721) (1,329.084) 
    
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 
R-squared 0.321 0.324 0.325 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: This condensed table shows the Firm Code dummies condensed into one. The dummy 
variables are all not statistically significant hence, it makes sense to have a condensed version of 
them instead of having them listed.  
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Regressions with Expanded Firm Code Dummy Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Payment Payment Payment 
    
Settlement Amount 167.610*** 168.161*** 167.891*** 
 (3.840) (3.899) (3.916) 
Age 8.560 12.013 13.496 
 (17.421) (17.471) (17.501) 
Open to Close 308.890 318.366 343.087 
 (311.345) (310.946) (311.329) 
Brooklyn  16.661 265.752 
  (944.331) (959.153) 
Bronx  2,116.643** 2,027.010** 
  (936.753) (941.286) 
Queens  519.896 719.692 
  (1,016.419) (1,033.117) 
Staten Island  -3,375.753* -3,748.275** 
  (1,793.173) (1,861.055) 
Firm - Brooklyn   -1,342.817 
   (1,194.298) 
Firm - Bronx   1,652.894 
   (1,388.235) 
Firm - Queens   -1,213.602 
   (1,219.346) 
Firm - Staten Island   3,368.159 
   (2,707.118) 
Firm - Not NYC   566.315 
   (841.314) 
Firm Code 23 -3,077.937 -2,456.986 -1,221.140 
 (4,751.589) (4,760.367) (4,852.958) 
Firm Code 34 -969.389 -640.809 -259.072 
 (3,599.646) (3,604.107) (3,678.627) 
Firm Code 42 -558.037 -1,230.520 83.390 
 (3,018.339) (3,022.057) (3,199.984) 
Firm Code 65 -117.524 -194.947 -125.083 
 (4,481.266) (4,476.598) (4,487.069) 
Firm Code 131 -1,493.116 -1,147.971 -1,122.009 
 (3,967.389) (3,965.433) (3,977.926) 
Firm Code 132 -1,153.334 -1,373.333 20.525 
 (3,423.631) (3,419.745) (3,572.303) 
Firm Code 159 -2,151.088 -2,363.069 -2,775.134 
 (5,727.714) (5,722.517) (5,755.516) 
Firm Code 164 -1,879.377 -1,841.404 -471.101 
 (3,271.638) (3,267.943) (3,425.303) 
Firm Code 213 -282.291 -277.642 -333.586 
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 (2,340.006) (2,338.541) (2,348.333) 
Firm Code 222 -2,487.396 1,079.254 -1,874.881 
 (3,885.544) (4,122.031) (4,685.479) 
Firm Code 225 -2,132.259 -3,576.503 -3,364.770 
 (7,745.349) (7,746.912) (7,752.725) 
Firm Code 414 -1,710.175 -955.545 395.754 
 (3,270.151) (3,275.900) (3,420.424) 
Firm Code 440 -1,780.079 -1,561.091 -423.504 
 (4,256.582) (4,273.605) (4,383.327) 
Firm Code 470 -2,551.023 -2,679.723 -2,544.819 
 (4,614.212) (4,609.456) (4,620.158) 
Firm Code 481 -2,340.821 -2,906.539 -2,809.786 
 (2,559.624) (2,560.575) (2,581.844) 
Firm Code 541 -2,293.041 -2,228.615 -2,197.787 
 (2,173.126) (2,171.030) (2,196.908) 
Firm Code 680 -2,416.162 -2,437.615 -2,986.284 
 (5,482.116) (5,475.480) (5,508.060) 
Firm Code 772 -1,122.587 -1,085.778 -945.134 
 (3,543.205) (3,542.602) (3,558.738) 
Firm Code 773 199.351 348.099 409.596 
 (2,122.625) (2,120.499) (2,145.906) 
Firm Code 780 -2,285.672 -1,779.107 -484.554 
 (3,097.380) (3,100.541) (3,256.325) 
Firm Code 801 -1,968.987 -1,209.266 10.695 
 (4,621.846) (4,633.242) (4,727.076) 
Firm Code 803 -918.812 -1,062.988 -1,571.229 
 (3,268.831) (3,265.456) (3,323.318) 
Firm Code 808 -1,693.826 -1,541.251 -1,533.020 
 (3,015.338) (3,012.166) (3,029.911) 
Firm Code 923 -2,061.757 -2,277.307 -1,933.305 
 (4,609.241) (4,607.870) (4,636.380) 
Firm Code 978 -1,680.721 -1,743.831 -536.171 
 (5,267.913) (5,264.151) (5,346.221) 
Firm Code 1125 -2,019.624 -1,962.285 -1,960.760 
 (3,179.936) (3,177.484) (3,195.309) 
Firm Code 1276 -1,578.191 -1,458.737 -298.404 
 (4,254.025) (4,258.305) (4,374.528) 
Firm Code 1511 -1,750.014 -1,892.856 -1,849.610 
 (3,176.397) (3,173.022) (3,189.657) 
Constant 3,455.124*** 2,588.258** 2,363.366* 
 (1,043.218) (1,294.721) (1,329.084) 
    
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 
R-squared 0.321 0.324 0.325 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: This extended table shows the Firm Code dummy variables. They are all not 
statistically significant however, for reference purposes they are listed.  
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Table 7: Probit regressions of Recoupment on the log of settlement amount. Recoupment is a 
binary variable which equals 1 if the respondent received a recoupment and 0 otherwise. Model 
(2) includes client borough identifiers and Model (3) includes client borough identifiers as well 
as firm location identifiers. Models (4)-(6) are the average marginal effects of the first three 
models respectively. 
  
Probit Regressions 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Recoupment Recoupment Recoupment Recoupment Recoupment Recoupment        
Settlement Amount 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009***  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Open to Close 0.232*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.085***  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Brooklyn 
 
-0.222*** -0.208*** 
 
-0.079*** -0.072***   
(0.045) (0.047) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Bronx 
 
-0.003      -0.006 
 
-0.001 -0.002   
(0.046) (0.047) 
 
(0.017) (0.016) 
Queens 
 
-0.390*** -0.354*** 
 
-0.137*** -0.120***   
(0.057) (0.049) 
 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Staten Island 
 
-0.371*** -0.297*** 
 
-0.131*** -0.102***   
(0.077) (0.087) 
 
(0.026) (0.029) 
Firm- Brooklyn 
  
-0.154* 
  
-0.053*    
(0.043) 
  
(0.014) 
Firm- Bronx 
  
-0.228*** 
  
-0.077***    
(0.062) 
  
(0.020) 
Firm- Queens 
  
-0.326*** 
  
-0.109***    
(0.045) 
  
(0.015) 
Firm- Staten Island 
  
-0.219 
  
-0.074    
(0.102) 
  
(0.034) 
Firm- Not in NYC 
  
0.104*** 
  
0.037***    
(0.039) 
  
(0.014) 
Constant -0.989*** -0.869*** -0.874*** 
   
 
(0.042) (0.057) (0.583) 
   
       
Observations 9,521 9,521 9,521 9,521 9,521 9,521 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table 8: Heckman regressions using Payment and Recoupment. Recoupment is a binary variable 
which equals 1 if the respondent received a recoupment and 0 otherwise. Payment is measured in 
dollar amounts. Model (1) shows the regression on Payment. Model (2) shows the probit 
regression on Recoupment and Model (3) shows the average marginal effects of Model (2). 
Heckman Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Payment Recoupment AME on Recoupment 
    
Settlement Amount  150.597*** 0.029*** 0.010*** 
 
(5.210) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -132.650*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
 
(19.324) (0.000) (0.000) 
Open to Close -3247.633*** 0.190*** 0.063***  
(348.232) (0.014) (0.004) 
Brooklyn 2299.103** -0.100** -0.033** 
 
(1095.32) (0.043) (0.015) 
Bronx 896.706 0.050 0.017 
 
(1088.554) (0.043) (0.015) 
Queens 4463.201*** -0.234*** -0.077***  
(1164.395) (0.046) (0.015) 
Staten Island 1329.962 -0.122 -0.041  
(2057.961) (0.080) (0.026) 
Firm- Brooklyn 2758.722*** -0.134*** -0.045*** 
 
(1062.947) (0.041) (0.013) 
Firm- Bronx 4976.771*** -0.206*** -0.068***  
(1519.248) (0.059) (0.019) 
Firm- Queens 5235.746*** -0.271*** -0.088***  
(1144.461) (0.043) (0.014) 
Firm- Staten Island 6420.715** -0.236** -0.077** 
 
(2561.631) (0.097) (0.030) 
Firm- Not in NYC -724.226 0.087** 0.030**  
(1470.157) (0.037) 0.013 
Constant 29260.29*** 
  
 
-1470.157 
  
    
Observations 9,521 9,521 9,521 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  34 
 
 
Table 9: Two Stage Heckman regressions using Payment and Recoupment. Recoupment is a 
binary variable which equals 1 if the respondent received a recoupment and 0 otherwise. 
Payment is measured in dollar amounts. Model (1) shows the regression on Payment. Model (2) 
Two-Stage Heckman Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
VARIABLES Payment Recoupment AME on Recoupment 
 
     
Settlement Amount 139.946*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 
 
 
(5.843) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Age -60.532*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 
 
 
(20.938) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
Open to Close -1940.972*** 0.255*** 0.089*** 
 
 
(443.876) (0.014) (0.005) 
 
Brooklyn 1682.600 -0.193*** -0.068*** 
 
 
(1039.428) (0.046) (0.016) 
 
Bronx 1665.107* 0.009 0.003 
 
 
(1007.007) (0.046) (0.017) 
 
Queens 3001.691** -0.337*** -0.118*** 
 
 
(1138.168) (0.048) (0.017) 
 
Staten Island -1708.721 -0.288*** -0.101*** 
 
 
1975.526 (0.086) (0.029) 
 
Firm- Brooklyn 1175.214 -0.175*** -0.062*** 
 
 
(1064.811) (0.042) (0.015) 
 
Firm- Bronx 4041.988*** -0.230*** -0.080*** 
 
 
(1468.129) (0.061) (0.021) 
 
Firm- Queens 2681.113** -0.345*** -0.118*** 
 
 
(1213.498) (0.045) (0.015) 
 
Firm- Staten Island 5900.166** -0.234** -0.081** 
 
 
(2513.721) (0.101) (0.034) 
 
Firm- Not in NYC -64.8643 0.098** 0.035** 
 
 
(854.6039) (0.039) (0.014) 
 
Constant 19069.75 -0.828*** 
  
 
-2597.675 (0.058) 
  
     
Observations 9,521 9,521 9,521 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
